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RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEYS -

CENSURE -

PRIVATE MISCONDUCT AS GROUND FOR

DISCIPLINARY ACTION.- In re Serritella, 5 T11.2d 392, 125 N.E.2d
531 (1955). Following a hearing, a recommendation of censure
against the defendant attorney was filed with the Illinois Supreme Court by the committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar
Association, as provided for by Supreme Court Rule 59, ILL. ANN.
STAT. c.110, § 259.59 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1954). The committee
found that the defendant had cashed payroll checks issued to a
non-existent person by the Cook County treasurer. In order to
cash the checks, the defendant endorsed them with his name and
also with the name of the non-existent person. The defendant was
given the checks by his mother-in-law. She had received them
from her brother, the defendant's uncle, who used the name of the
fictitious person as an alias to defraud the Cook County treasury
of payroll funds for which no work was done. The defendant had
actual authority from his mother-in-law to sign and cash the
checks, and he turned over to her the money derived therefrom,
receiving no benefit himself from the transaction. There was no
evidence to show that the defendant had any knowledge of how
the checks were originally obtained, nor that he had any intention
of participating in a fraudulent scheme.
The question presented to the court by the recommendation
was whether an attorney's nonprofessional conduct in cashing
checks that were fraudulently procured by another party would
furnish grounds for disciplinary action if the attorney had
acted in good faith. The Supreme Court of Illinois ordered the
censure rule discharged, refusing to discipline the defendant in
the absence of proof that his actions had been prompted by any
improper or illegal motives.
At common law, it was an established rule that a lawyer
could be disciplined for misconduct not committed in his professional capacity as an attorney. 5 Am. JuR., Attorneys at law § 276
(1936). In order to avoid policing the entire lives of its officers,
however, the courts in later years have moved with caution in
matters of private misconduct by an attorney. This attitude was
revealed in Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927),
where the court said, 19 F.2d at 724:
We take it to be a sound principle that the court has no regulatory power over the private life of members of the Bar, and that
it cannot exclude them from practice for acts in that capacity
unless they be such as to clearly demonstrate their unfitness to
longer enjoy the privileges of the profession.
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This statement represents the majority view. A few states
hold to the contrary of this principle, allowing no disciplinary
action for acts committed by the attorney in his capacity as a
private person. In re Burch, 73 Ohio App. 97, 54 N.E.2d 803
(1943). In 1873, this latter view was also recognized as the law
in Illinois, People ex rel. Noyes v. Allison, 68 ill. 151 (1873),
but it has since been reversed, People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 356, 116 N.E. 189 (1917).
Frequently the private misconduct is such that it results in
conviction of a common law or statutory crime. 7 C.J.S., Attorney
and Client § 21 (1937). In such a case, the test as to whether
disciplinary action should be taken by a grievance committee
is whether or not the attorney has been convicted of a felony
or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Ex parte Wall,
107 U.S. 265, 273 (1882).
It is not necessary that the misconduct in a private capacity
be such as constitutes a crime before disbarment, suspension, or
censure will be warranted. In People ex rel. Healy v. Macauley,
230 Ill. 208, 82 N.E. 612 (1907), the court stated, 82 N.E. at 614:
The standard of personal and professional integrity which should
be applied to persons admitted to practice law in the courts is not
satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the
penalties of the criminal law.
The test used most often at common law in cases of private
misconduct, there being no criminal conviction, was that used in
Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 592 (1874), when
the court stated, 73 Ky. at 597:
... and when an attorney commits an act ... showing such a
want of personal or professional honesty as renders him unworthy
of public confidence, it is not only the province but the duty of the
court . . . to strike his name from the roll of attorneys.
In that case, the attorney was disbarred for altering a letter,
exchanged between two judges, so as to fraudulently obtain the
release on bail of the attorney's nephew from jail. See also,
Delano's Case, 58 N.H. 5 (1876), where an attorney was disbarred for misappropriating money received as a town's tax
collector.
Two other tests are also applied to these cases of private misconduct with no criminal conviction. The first is the moral
turpitude standard, under which an attorney will be disciplined
for any misconduct revealing moral turpitude, that is, anything
knowingly done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
In re Cruickshank, 47 Cal. App. 496, 190 Pac. 1038 (1920), wherein an attorney was disbarred for misusing money loaned to
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him for a specific purpose. The second test is the common honesty
and decency test, under which the license of an attorney will
be revoked when his habits reveal that he is unworthy of public
trust or when they become such as to bring scandal upon the
courts and the legal profession. In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168
S.W.2d 730 (1943), where, among other things, an attorney was
publicly intoxicated and passed bad checks. See also, In re
Wilson, 79 Kan. 450, 100 Pac. 75 (1909), where one count of the
charges which resulted in the attorney's disbarment was for
personal immorality and vice; People ex rel. Healy v. Macauley,
supra, in which an attorney was disbarred for initiating a conspiracy to harass and extort money from a business corporation
by forming other corporations with the same or similar names.
Supplementing these general standards is a rule in some
jurisdictions that an attorney who engages in private business
transactions will be required to maintain a stricter degree of
honesty than would the ordinary business man. In re Genser,
15 N.J. 600, 105 A.2d 829 (1954). Other jurisdictions, however,
hold that only a "business man" standard will be required. In re
Renehan, 19 N.M. 640, 145 Pac. 111 (1914).
A common law defense to charges of private misconduct, not
involving a criminal conviction, is illustrated in In re Jones, 68
Utah 213, 249 Pac. 803 (1926), where the court held that an
attorney would not be disciplined for private misconduct unless
it was gross and infamous. Accord, People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Hoering, 317 Ill. 390, 148 N.E. 299 (1925), where it is
stated ".

.

. this court has held that there may be misconduct of

an attorney in his private capacity so gross as to require his
disbarment." 148 N.E. at 301.
Good faith on the part of the attorney is also a common law
defense in disciplinary proceedings for misconduct in a private
capacity. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Hansen, 316 11L
502, 147 N.E. 431 (1925), the defendant attorney was exonerated
as there was no clear and satisfactory proof of fraudulent and
dishonest motives behind his conduct, though he paid for a
judgment with a worthless check, misrepresented certain facts
about a business venture, and misused funds given to him for
a specific purpose.
The good faith defense was disallowed in In re Ellis, 371 Ill.
113, 20 N.E.2d 96 (1939), and in In re Bookman, 196 App. Div.
765, 188 N.Y. Supp. 271 (1st Dep't 1921), but the two cases are
distinguishable from the instant case in that they both involved
professional rather than private misconduct. In In re Ellis, supra,
the attorney had deliberately put himself in a situation such as
gives the appearance of bad faith, causing the court to state
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that an attorney is bound to "shun even the appearance of any
fraudulent design or purpose." 20 N.E.2d at 98. And according to
the court in In re Bookman, supra, an attorney is able to act in
good faith only because of his ignorance of the ethical standards
required by his profession.
The subject of professional discipline is covered by statutes to
a great extent today, as in IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-3614 (Burns
1946), and MASS. ANN. LAWS c.221, § 40 (1955). Neither these
statutes nor the Canons of Professional Ethics are of much assistance, however, in seeking to apply general standards to
specific cases. The Indiana and Massachusetts statutes, like
many others, merely reiterate the very general standards of the
common law. Even when the statutes attempt to be specific, the
generality is not overcome, since it is held that statutes do not
curtail the court's inherent common law power to discipline an
attorney for any behavior deserving of discipline. Delano's Case,
58 N.H. 5 (1876). The Canons of Professional Ethics are concerned with misconduct in a professional capacity.
Two cases in which the private misconduct of the attorney
warranted discipline present fact situations similar to the main
case. The attorney in In re Brown, 389 Ill. 516, 59 N.E.2d 855
(1945), was suspended for signing over checks to his partner
that facilitated the defrauding of a corporate treasury; and in
In re Osmond, 174 Okla. 561, 54 P.2d 319 (1935), the attorney
was disbarred for cashing travellers checks that were stolen in
a robbery. However in both cases the court found clear evidence
that the attorneys were knowingly participating in a fraudulent
scheme.
In the principal case, the court repeatedly emphasized that
there was no proof that the defendant knew of the circumstances
surrounding the obtaining of the checks which he cashed, and
hence there was no proof of improper or illegal motive. It is
submitted that the case was correctly decided in view of the
three standards commonly employed to test an attorney's private misconduct, discussed above, and taking into consideration
the precedent of Illinois law in regard to the requirement of
grossness, and particularly in regard to the defense of good
faith. It seems neither necessary nor just that an attorney be
condemned for private acts which he performs in good faith,
and which prove to be wrongful only because of circumstances
of which he has no knowledge. This is the line which the
principal case has drawn. If justice has been denied in this case,
it was due to the failure of the grievance committee to uncover
the true facts of the situation involved, and not to any failure
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of the court to reach a correct judicial decision based upon the
facts that were revealed.
Robert P. Gorman

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-

COURTS -IMMUNITY

OF FOREIGN

City
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). In 1948 an
agency of the Republic of China deposited $200,000 with petitioner National City Bank of New York. When respondent Republic of China subsequently attempted to withdraw its funds,
the bank resisted payment and interposed two counterclaims
seeking an affirmative judgment of $1,634,432 on defaulted treasury notes of respondent owned by petitioner. The district court
dismissed the counterclaims on a plea of sovereign immunity.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also dismissed, on
the ground that the counterclaims could not be maintained because they were not based on the same subject matter as the
original action, and hence to allow them to be enforced would
be an invasion of respondent's sovereign immunity. The ruling
of the district court refusing leave to amend the counterclaims,
by denominating them set-offs, was also affirmed.
On certiorari the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve
the question whether a foreign sovereign, by bringing suit in
the courts of the United States, thereby subjects itself to a
counterclaim based on a subject matter different from that of
the main action. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of
the lower courts and held that by bringing suit in the courts
of the United States the Republic of China thereby waived its
immunity and left itself open to counterclaims regardless of
whether or not they arose out of the same subject matter as
the main action.
By destroying the long standing barrier of sovereign immunity
to the invocation of defensive counterclaims which do not arise
out of the subject matter of the principal action, the decision
in this case marks the furthest advance made by the Supreme
Court in its siege against the privilege of immunity afforded a
foreign sovereign. The basic theory supporting this immunity
was first expounded in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), where it was held that an American citizen could not assert title to an armed national vessel
of a foreign power, the vessel being found within the waters
of the United States. The basis for the decision was an implied
consent of nations to respect the sovereignty of other powers
SOVEREIGN

FROM SET-OFF

AND

COUNTERCLAIM. -National
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and to grant them immunity from suit for the mutual benefit
of the nations involved.
The doctrine is expounded in The Schooner Exchange case,
supra, had been modified before the decision in French Republic
v. Inland Nay. Co., 263 Fed. 410 (E.D. Mo. 1920). There petitioner, Republic of France, had paid $330,000 on a contract
under which the defendant, Inland Navigation Company, was
to repair and complete certain barges. The petitioner sought to
recover its deposit but the defendant alleged damages of $600,000
as the result of a breach of the contract by petitioner, and this
amount was sought by defendant in the form of a counterclaim.
The court held that by bringing suit in the courts of the United
States a foreign sovereign does not thereby waive its immunity
and subject itself to a counterclaim upon which an affirmative
judgment is asked, even though it would be permissible as
against a private suitor. However, the court asserted that a
counterclaim may be had up to the amount pleaded by the
sovereign, and that " the law is unquestionably in consonance
with this concession ...

."

263 Fed. at 411. Evidently, the theory

of The Schooner Exchange does not extend to mere set-offs.
The application of this theory was limited even more by
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938),
wherein the Supreme Court held that the New York State
statute of limitations runs against a foreign sovereign just as
against private litigants. In this case the United States sued on
a certain claim as the assignee of the Soviet Government. The
claim was for deposits which had been repudiated by the bank
as against the Soviet Government a number of years earlier,
thus starting the running of the statutory period. The Court
expressly recognized two important facts: upon the principle of
comity, the public property of foreign sovereigns is not amenable to suits in our courts without the consent of such sovereigns, 304 U.S. at 134; and that the United States Government
is exempt from the operation of statutes of limitations, 304 U.S.
at 132. But the Court was convinced that a different rule should
apply here because "by voluntarily appearing in the role of
suitor it [the foreign sovereign] abandons its immunity from
suit and subjects itself to the procedure and rules of decision
governing the forum which it has sought." 304 U.S. at 134.
The Inland Nay. Co. and Guaranty Trust Co. cases, supra, are
only two in a series of modern cases which mark the trend of
the decisions in the field of sovereign immunity. The relaxing
of the barrier to claims against the sovereign first became apparent in cases involving our own government. In United States
v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924), damages were held award-
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able against the United States as the result of a collision between
a vessel chartered by the United States Fleet Corporation and
the Norwegian ship "Thekla." There was no statutory authority
for the award; the Court was of the opinion that the United
States, by coming into court to assert a claim, took the position
of a private party and the court could then do complete justice
between the litigants. In a later case, while not granting an
affirmative judgment, the Supreme Court allowed a cross-claim
to completely offset a claim of the government. United States
v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
In actions concerning foreign sovereigns, the immunity doctrine
has been relaxed by the courts so as to allow a defendant to
interplead an adverse claimant where a foreign power seeks to
enforce a claim. Republic of China v. American Express Co.,
195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952).
In considering whether immunity is to be granted to a foreign
sovereign, the courts look to the State Department for guidance,
and once the Department has spoken, the courts generally consider it their duty to follow the policy suggested. Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Netherlands East Indies Government, 75 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y.
1947). Cf. Fields v. Predionica I Tkanica A.D., 263 App. Div.
115, 31 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1941). As pointed out by the
Court in the principal case, the State Department has recently
noted the desirability of relaxing the strict rule of foreign
sovereign immunity. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). The Department noted that a restrictive policy has replaced the conventional doctrine of complete immunity in nations all over
the world. It was further argued that a grant of immunity to
foreign sovereigns in many cases would not be in consonance
with the policy of our own government in subjecting itself to
suit. This was undoubtedly a basic consideration in the Court's
decision in the instant case.
The fact situation in United States v. National City Bank, 83
F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 563 (1936), was
similar to that of the principal case. There the Russian Government sued for funds deposited to its credit in the defendant
bank; the bank attempted to offset this claim against certain
promissory notes issued by the Russian Government and held
by the bank. The court allowed the set-off to the extent of the
Russian claim.
In the more recent case of United States v. New York Trust
Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), the United States had received title to funds deposited in the defendant bank by the
Russian Government by virtue of the Litvinov assignment. In a
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suit by the United States to collect these deposits, the bank
interposed a set-off based on notes of the Russian Government
owned by the bank. Here the court refused to allow the set-off
on the ground that it was not based on the same subject matter
as the original action. United States v. National City Bank,
supra, was distinguished because in that case the claim of the
bank on the notes was payable out of the deposits held by it,
and the set-off against the sovereign thus, in effect, arose out
of the same transaction on which the sovereign's claim was based.
The instant case extends the rule of National City Bank and
eradicates the rule of the New York Trust case, supra, the Court
stating that ".

.

. the ultimate thrust of the consideration of

fair dealing which allows a set-off or counterclaim based on the
same subject matter reaches the present situation." 348 U.S.
at 365.
In determining the reason for the repudiation of the long
standing doctrine adhered to in the New York Trust case, the
decision in the principal case is best viewed in the light of considerations enunciated in The Schooner Exchange and Inland
Nay. Co. cases. Chief Justice Marshall's primary reason for
granting immunity to foreign sovereigns in The Schooner Exchange was the mutual benefit of the nations involved. In the
Inland Nay. Co. case the court refused to grant complete immunity to a foreign sovereign in a situation where it would
have been applied to the United States Government because
there was no persuasive demand of public policy generated by
the nature of the suitor. In other words, no benefit would accrue
to the United States or its citizens by granting immunity in the
case. Thus, in both these cases the primary consideration was
the ultimate benefit which would accrue to the United States
by offering immunity to the foreign sovereign.
While the Court in the instant case nowhere discusses the
benefit theory, the reasoning of the earlier cases suggests that
the Court may have been influenced here by more than mere
"considerations of fair dealing." By taking note of the fact that
the principle of sovereign immunity is coming into public disfavor, the Court could also mean that this country would prefer
to suffer the loss of mutual benefit between nations rather than
place the burden of immunity upon the shoulders of individual
defendants interposing counterclaims.
The qfiestion as to the true reason for the relaxing of the
immunity barrier in the principal case undoubtedly will cause
speculation as to just how far the Court will go in the future,
especially in the realm of affirmative counterclaims. But the
mere problem of enforcing a judgment against a foreign sover-
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eign should preclude the allowance of any affirmative awards.
In addition, it is unlikely that the State Deparment will allow
any future cases on this point to come before the Court without
making some sort of recommendation, all of which will bear
heavily on future decisions. Perhaps the basic reasons for this
latest inroad upon the privilege of foreign sovereign immunity will
be given a better explanation in later decisions of the Court. Meanwhile, the decision in the instant case is basically sound. It promotes the interests of natural justice by placing a foreign sovereign
on a level with a private litigant, at least as concerns a set-off,
including those arising out of separate transactions, whenever
that sovereign attempts to enforce a claim in the courts of the
United States.
Edward J. Griffin

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw- EQUAL PROTECTION- SEPARATE AcCOMMODATIONS ON PUBLIC CARRIERs. - Flemming v. South Caro-

lina Elec. and Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955). The plaintiff, a
negro woman, was a passenger on one of defendant's busses. The
driver of the bus required her to change her seat in accordance
with the segregation law of South Carolina regarding motor
vehicle carriers. S.C. CODE § 58-1491 (1952). Plaintiff brought
this action for damages by virtue of the Civil Rights legislation.
17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952), claiming defendant
had violated her constitutional rights under color of state law. The
district court dismissed the case on the ground that the state
segregation statute was valid under the decision of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
On appeal to this court, the question presented was whether
a state may lawfully segregate races on public carriers in view
of the recent Supreme Court decisions in the field of public education holding "equal but separate" facilities violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection of the law wherer
states are concerned, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause where
the federal government is concerned, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954). The court of appeals held that, in view of these
and other decisions, the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson, supra, could no longer be regarded as the correct
statement of the law and remanded the case to the lower court.
What is probably the earliest decision to specifically deal with
segregation on common carriers is unimportant from a constitutional standpoint. The case dealt with a Congressional license
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permitting a Virginia railway company to extend its line through
the District of Columbia. In granting the license, Congress imposed a condition that no person could be excluded from the cars
because of color. The practice of the railroad was to use separate
cars for the negro and white races. In ruling that the condition
was violated by this practice, the Supreme Court held that
Congress had required that the races be placed on an equality.
Railroad Company v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).
Separation was held to violate the legislative requirement of
equal treatment.
During the reconstruction of the South after the Civil War
the legislature of Louisiana passed a statute forbidding any discrimination by public carriers. A negro was discriminated against
on a steam boat operating on the Mississippi and brought a civil
action against the owner. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court it was held that this statute was invalid as an undue burden upon interstate commerce. The ruling of the court was based
upon the fact that neighboring states required segregation, and
if river commerce was subject to a non-segregation law in Louisiana, the varying treatment would hamper interstate commerce
which was within the power of Congress to control. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), inter alia, dealt with
segregation in common carriers. An act of Congress which declared illegal any discrimination in inns, public carriers, and
places of amusement anywhere in the United States was struck
down on the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
civil rights against state action only, and does not authorize Congressional legislation over private conduct in respect to the
guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision greatly hampered the advancement toward racial integration on the
level of federal action.
Another obstacle to rise up in the law preventing earlier racial
integration in the United States was the "equal but separate"
doctrine - the cornerstone of legal racial segregation. In 1890,
the General Assembly of Louisiana, then independent of Northern control, passed the following law: "[A]ll railway companies
carrying passengers ... shall provide equal, but separate accommodations for the white and colored races. .. ." (emphasis added).
A man, one-eighth negro, was ordered by a conductor to sit in a
coach set aside for negroes; he refused and was promptly jailed.
Upon review, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the statute as a proper exercise of the police power of the state.
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra. Reasoning that many situations involved legal segregation, the Court found that where the habits
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and customs of the people traditionally treated the white race and
the colored race as separate, a state was not acting unreasonably
in making a distinction. In support of its decision, the Court referred to the then uncontested segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia, and the "equal but separate" doctrine became the Law of the Land. However, a warning note was
sounded in the dissent by Justice Harlan, 163 U.S. 537 at 559:
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove
to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the
Dred Scott case.

He continued, 163 U.S. at 562:
The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations for passengers in
railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong
this day done.

As the Fourteenth Amendment argument against segregation
was for the moment drastically limited, a reversion to the interstate commerce argument was now made. The segregation statute
of Mississippi, substantially identical to the statute in the Plessy
case, had been upheld in Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Ry.
v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890) (decided six years prior to the
Plessy case) because of an earlier decision of the Mfississippi Supreme Court that the statute had no extraterritorial application.
The Court held that because the statute did not apply to persons
travelling in interstate commerce, the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution was not violated. No question of civil rights
was raised before the Court. Later the United States Supreme
Court placed a similar construction on the Kentucky "equal but
separate" carrier facility law, upholding it against the contention that it violated the commerce clause. Cheasepeake and Ohio
Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900).
Any effectiveness of the commerce clause in preventing segregation in transportation was dissipated when the Supreme Court
held that a company-imposed segregation rule was not violative
of the commerce clause, even though the railway was an interstate company. Chiles v. Cheasepeake & Ohio Ry., 218 U.S. 71
(1910). Reasoning that Congress by inaction intended to leave
interstate carriers unfettered so long as their regulations were
reasonable, the Court held that segregation was not in violation
of the commerce clause. The commerce clause argument against
segregation in transportation was met squarely with the Tenth
Amendment in South Covington & CincinnatiStreet Ry. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399 (1920).
While the arguments against segregation were, after the pronouncement of the "equal but separate" doctrine, based in the
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main on the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, there was still an insistence that the accommodations
provided be actually physically equal. A case important for its
discussion of this requisite was McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, and
SantaFe Ry., 235 U.S. 151,161 (1914), although the case is not controlling because dismissed for lack of standing. Equality of accommodations was also insisted upon when a negro member of
the House of Representatives was required to travel by coach
although pullman cars were available to white passengers. However, the legal basis of the decision was the Interstate Commerce
Act, 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 3 (1952). Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S.
816 (1950).
The argument that statutes requiring segregation place an
undue burden upon interstate commerce was at last successful
in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), when Hall v. DeCuir,
supra, was finally used as authority in declaring invalid the Virginia statute requiring segregation in public carriers.
Now, by the instant case, and others which will doubtless follow, Plessy v. Ferguson and the "separate but equal" doctrine is
directly under attack-the civil rights argument is again in
vogue. The onus is now upon the Supreme Court to clearly state
the scope of its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, supra.
In establishing the "separate but equal" doctrine, the Court in
1896 relied upon the school segregation in the District of Columbia. It is submitted that the present Court will find this reliance
fatal to the entire doctrine of "equal but separate" accommodations in transportation because of the ruling in Boiling v. Sharpe,
supra, which struck at the doctrine's very foundation.
John E. Roberts.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION--STATUTE VESTING
DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN GRAND JURY OR MAGISTRATE TO
CHARGE ACCUSED WITH FELONY OR MISDEMEANOR HELD UNCONSTIOre. . . ., 281 P.2d 698 (1955).
TUTIONAL.-State v. Pirkey....
The defendant was indicted and charged by a grand jury with
committing a felony for drawing a bank check against insufficient
funds. The indictment was returned pursuant to Oregon Laws
1949, Chapter 129, Section 1, which was subsequently carried
over as ORE. REV. STAT. § 165.225 (1953), with some substantial
changes. The court was concerned only with the original form of
the statute which read, in part, as follows:
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Any person who... shall willfully, with intent to defraud, make
or draw, or utter or deliver any check.., for the payment of money,
knowing at the time of such making ... that the maker ... has
not sufficient funds in, or credit with said bank ... for the payment
of such check ...shall be guilty of a crime and may be proceeded
against either as for a misdemeanor or as for a felony, in the
discretion of the grand jury or the magistrate to whom complaint
is made ....
Defendant filed a demurrer to the indictment upon the ground
that the above statute was contrary to the Constitution of the
State of Oregon; he also contended the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution with regard
to "due process" and "equal protection of the laws." The defendant further claimed the statute was void for indefiniteness
and uncertainty. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the indictment. The state appealed to the Supreme Court
of Oregon.
The question presented to the supreme court was whether this
statute was constitutional in view of the above mentioned provisions of the state and federal constitutions, where the magistrate
or grand jury has discretion to charge the defendant with either
a misdemeanor or a felony.
The supreme court affirmed .the trial court and held that part
of the statute unconstitutional which gave to the grand jury or
magistrate, "the unguided and untrammeled discretion to determine whether a defendant shall be charged with a felony or a
misdemeanor." The court held that the statute denied the defendant the "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The court also stressed the fact that the statute
was an invalid encroachment upon the prerogative and duty of
the courts to determine and fix punishment, and further that the
statute provided no standards to guide the grand jury or the
magistrate in the exercise of their discretion.
The guarantee of "equal protection" in the Constitution was an
attempt to limit undue favor and special privileges afforded certain individuals and classes, which, if not guarded would lead to
hostile discrimination and inequality. Truax v. Corrigan,257 U.S.
312, 332 (1921). Discrimination cannot be regarded as reasonable
if it offends the ". . . plain standards of common sense." Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison,301 U.S. 459,
462 (1937). Here the Supreme Court held that a statute which
discriminated between mutual and stock insurance companies as
to whose employees could sell insurance was unreasonable and
void. In the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), the Supreme Court held a San Francisco ordinance void
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which gave arbitrary power to a board of supervisors to withhold their consent as to the opening of laundries. It was determined that the main purpose of the ordinance was to prevent
people of Chinese descent from operating this type of business.
The Court also found that those of the Caucasian race in the identical situation as the Chinese were permitted to operate laundries.
The Court was of the opinion that this was class legislation, at
least in its operative effects.
In holding a statute valid which provided for the sterilization
of mental defectives in state hospitals, the Supreme Court, in
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), stated, 274 U.S. at 208:
...the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can,
indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to
bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its
means allow.

A test of what is required to satisfy "equal protection" was given
by the Idaho Supreme Court in J. C. Penny Co. v. Diefendorf,
54 Idaho 374, 32 P.2d 784 (1934), when the court stated that "The
Fourteenth Amendment . . . only requires the same means and

methods to be applied impartially to all the constituents of
each class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly
upon people in similar circumstances." 32 P.2d at 797.
If inequality results from a statutory classification, it does not
necessarily follow that the statute must be invalidated. To be invalid the statute must be "actually and palpably unreasonable
and arbitrary." Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422,
429 (1936) (dictum). The Supreme Court has upheld a statute
which provided that every person serving a life term in a state
prison, who commits assault with intent to kill, is punishable with
death. The Court held that differentiating between convicts serving life sentences and convicts serving lesser terms was a proper
basis for classification. Finley v. California, 222 U.S. 28 (1911).
In the case of Davis v. FloridaPower Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759
(1913), the Florida Supreme Court upheld a statute which discriminated between individuals and corporations as to liability
for wrongful death. The court stated that where there were reasonable and practical grounds for classification the statute should
be sustained, even though some other classification would appear
to be more in accord with the general welfare.
In considering the application of the requirement of "equal
protection" to criminal law, the Supreme Court in Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), stated at page 31: ".

.

. in the ad-

ministration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment
should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for
like offences." (Dictum). The problem of punishment and "equal
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protection" was again considered by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In this case the Court
held unconstitutional a statute which provided for sterilization of
criminals who had been convicted two or more times for crimes
amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude. The statute excluded offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory
laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, and for
this reason it was held contrary to the "equal protection" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated, 316 U.S. at 541:
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not
the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.

The court in Ex parte M/Iallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102 Pac. 374 (1909),
held that a repeat of the prisoner's original sentence as punishment for trying to escape from prison was arbitrary, unreasonable, and in no way based upon the nature, character, or gravity
of the offense. Yet the same court in reviewing a more recent
"escape" statute held that the provisions prescribing felony pun-

ishment for a felon who escaped, and a misdemeanor penalty for
a misdemeanant who escaped, were not arbitrary or unreasonable. Ex parte Knapp, 73 Idaho 505, 254 P.2d 411 (1953). In the
case of People v. Queen, 326 M. 492, 158 N.E. 148 (1927), the
courts had the power to sentence a person convicted of a crime to
the penitentiary or to the reformatory, and this judicial discretion
was held constitutional. In a similar case, Ex parte Rosencrantz,
211 Cal. 752, 297 Pac. 15 (1931), the statute gave the courts the
power to confine in the state prison or in the county jail one who
had fraudulently issued a check. As to the constitutionality of
this statute, the court said, 297 Pac. at 16:
Since every person charged with the offense has the same chance
for leniency as well as the same possibility of receiving the
maximum sentence, there is nothing discriminatory in the statute.

A California statute which gave the state board of prison directors the authority to determine the length of prison terms was
held to be constitutional, per curiam, in Ex parte Gough, 112 Cal.
App. 218, 296 Pac. 658 (1931), on the ground that the basis for
determining the sentence was the character of the prisoner.
The court in Skinner v. Prather, 136 Kan. 879, 18 P.2d 154
(1933), reviewed the application of its state habitual criminal act
and held that a defendant sentenced under the act would not be
deprived of "equal protection" simply because trial judges had
not applied the act to others in like circumstances. Only in a case
where the defendant could prove that the trial judge had acted
in bad faith by willfully and deliberately discriminating against
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him could the defendant successfully claim that he had been deprived of "equal protection." In State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69
So.2d 738 (1954), a statute prohibiting parole of narcotic violators was held not to be a violation of "equal protection of the
laws" on the basis that all members of the same class were treated
alike. The Supreme Court, in two early decisions, Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915), and Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. Little
Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919), attempted to clarify the concept of
"equal protection" and its application to punishment. In the former case the defendant alleged that he had been deprived of
"equal protection of the laws" because he had been sentenced to
fourteen years imprisonment for perjury, while the average penalty for crimes of greater gravity was five years. The Supreme
Court disposed of this contention by stating that the extent of
punishment for a particular crime was to be determined by the
legislatures of the several states. In the latter case it was not
enough to show that a law had not been enforced against other
persons although it was enforced against the person claiming discrimination.
The state legislatures have the sole and comprehensive power
of providing punishment for offenses committed against the state.
This power is unlimited except for the constitutional prohibitions
against excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishment.
State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 66 P.2d 360, 362 (1937) (dictum). In further support of this legislative power is the case of
Siipola v. Ness, 90 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Wash. 1950), where the
prison board gave the defendant a greater term than recommended by the sentencing judge or prosecuting attorney. In this
case the sentence of the board was held valid.
The court in the instant case laid great stress on the fact that
the magistrate or grand jury is given the power arbitrarily to determine whether to charge a defendant with a felony or a misdemeanor. The court pointed out that there was no criteria or standard in the statute which would serve to guide and limit the magistrate or grand jury in its decisions. This arbitrary power within
the hands of the grand jury or magistrate might well lead to unconscionable results. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra.
The traditional function of the grand jury has been to determine whether or not the state's evidence warrants bringing an
action against an accused and charging him with a specific crime
or crimes. United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co.. 45 F. Supp. 187,
192 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
The statute in the instant case authorized the committing magistrate, or the grand jury, to charge a defendant with either a
felony or a misdemeanor. There was no standard set up by which
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the magistrate or grand jury could guide themselves in reaching
their determination. This grant of unlimited and unrestricted
power proved fatal to the validity of the statute.
Ralph R. Blume

EVIDENCXE-CoNsTTUTIONAL LAw-ADmISSBIL
OF EVIENCE
BY UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SzuEE.-People v. Cahan,
... Cal .... , 282 P.2d 905 (1955). Defendant was charged with

OBTAMI

conspiring to engage in horserace bookmaking and related offenses in violation of California bookmaking laws. On trial, most
of the incriminating evidence introduced against the defendant
had been secured by Los Angeles police officers by breaking into
the defendant's establishment and secreting hidden microphones
whereby the police officers gathered incriminating statements.
In addition there was a considerable amount of evidence obtained
from the premises occupied by the defendant as a result of numerous forcible entries and seizures without search warrants.
The trial court admitted this evidence over objection and defendant was convicted. He appealed to the Supreme Court of California from the order placing him on probation and also from the
order denying him a new trial.
The court was thus presented with the question whether evidence obtained in violation of federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures should have
been admitted in the trial of the defendant. The Supreme Court
of California reversed the lower court and held the evidence to
be inadmissible. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court
also reversed its previous policy as to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. In People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac.
435 (1922), it was held that evidence was admissible in a criminal
action no matter how it was obtained. This case had been religiously followed by the California courts until the present time.
In overruling the Mayen case, supra,the Supreme Court of California came to the conclusion that it was now necessary to abolish
the previous rule because it had failed to effectively protect the
constitutional right of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The court said that civil suits and criminal prosecutions
against the offending officers were not sufficient deterrents against
the violation of the constitutional privilege, and, further, for the
courts to enforce the old rule was to condone this lawlessness.
There has been a considerable amount of conflict among the
courts on this proposition ever since the Supreme Court of the
United States decided that it would be proper to exclude such

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

(Vol. XXXI

evidence. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In this
case the defendant had been charged with a federal crime in a
federal court. Various letters of the accused had been seized by a
United States marshal without a search warrant and had been
used as evidence against him. The Supreme Court held that it
was error to admit such evidence. This initiated the so-called
"exclusionary rule." But this rule was to be applied only in federal courts, and in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), it was
held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not forbid the state courts from admitting such evidence in a criminal prosecution before a state court. This position
was reaffirmed in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). See
29 NOTRE DAME LAW. 660 (1954). However, if there is violence or

brutality involved the Supreme Court may find an infringement
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rochin
v. California,342 U.S. 165 (1952).

See 27 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 453

(1952). Thus, unless the procedure employed by the state law
enforcement officers "shocks the conscience," the state courts
have been left free to admit or exclude unlawfully obtained evidence as they see fit. Of course, it is conceded that affirmative
sanction by the states of unlawful police invasion of an individual's privacy would be contrary to the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (dictum).
The majority of the states today adher to the so-called "orthodox rule"; in other words, they admit such evidence. Probably
the best known case supporting the "orthodox rule" is People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
657 (1926). In that case a state officer obtained a blackjack from
the premises of the defendant by means of a trespass. The court
held that the evidence could be used against the accused even
though it had been illegally obtained. The reasoning underlying
the decision was that there was no distinction between a trespass
by an official person and a private one, and since the evidence
would be admitted if gathered by a private person, so should it
be admitted if gathered by an official of the state. The opinion
went on to relate that if the "exclusionary rule" need be adopted
because of public policy, it was a task for the legislature, not the
courts. This reasoning was followed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania when it approved the "orthodox rule," in Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 72 A.2d 575 (1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 844 (1950).
Several other reasons have been set forth by the courts to justify the "orthodox rule." One of these is that a court will not
pause to look into the legality or illegality of the method by which
the evidence was obtained, because it is an issue collateral to the
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trial. The only question that will be determined is whether or not
the evidence is relevant to the issue at trial. Commonwealth v.
Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N.E. 11, 13 (1923); State v. Lindway,
131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490, 497 (1936), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936). Other authorities say that it is
not good law to exclude the evidence and thereby effect a release
of a guilty criminal merely because the arresting officer blundered. State v. Black, 5 N.J. Misc. 48, 135 Ati. 685 (1926). In this
case, it was said by the court, 135 Atl. at page 686:
It will be observed that the result of such practice is not to
punish the individual who has violated the constitutional provision
by making an unreasonable search and seizure, but to shield the
criminal and penalize the people of the state by suppressing
evidence tending to prove an offense "against its peace and dignity."

In State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923), the
court stated that the reason for admitting contraband goods,
seized illegally by state officers, into evidence was that the defendant had no property right in such goods because they were
contraband. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to have
the goods returned or suppressed from evidence. This reasoning
has been adopted by few states. Today it seems that the states are
divided into two categories only, either for or against the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, and do not make a special
distinction for contraband goods.
On the other side of the controversy, the reasons seem equally
as compelling for the exclusion of such evidence. Freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures is, of course, one of the
most basic rights of our democratic society; and it is claimed that
in order to protect this constitutional right it is necessary to exclude such evidence. People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112
(1924). Furthermore, it is asserted that not to exclude such evidence would encourage unreasonable searches and seizures and
bring about an opinion in the people that the courts are encouraging these violations of constitutional rights. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860, 866 (1920) (dictum).
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and the
privilege against self-incrimination have always been construed
hand in hand, and many of the states who follow the "exclusionary rule" base their decisions jointly upon both. Gore v. State,

24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 Pac. 545 (1923); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis.
407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).
In People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919),

the court, after adopting the "exclusionary rule," proceeded to
try and reconcile the many conflicting cases on the ground that
most of the states exclude the evidence if a motion is made to
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suppress before the trial, and refuse to exclude it if the issue is
brought up only by objection during the trial. In later cases,
however, some states have excluded the evidence although no
motion was made before the trial. Youman v. Commonwealth,
supra; Rickards v. State, 6 Terry 573, 77 A.2d 199 (Del. 1950).
Three states have seen fit to enact legislation on this point, and
two of them have adopted the "exclusionary rule" without qualification. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 727a (Supp. 1954). The other state, Maryland, has
taken a middle-ground. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 35, § 5
(Supp. 1955), provides that in the case of a misdemeanor illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible. This seems to indicate that
such evidence would be admitted in a felony prosecution.
As the alignment stands today, 27 states still adher to the
"orthodox rule" and 20 have adopted the "exclusionary rule." See
338 U.S. at page 29. The pendulum has slowly been swinging toward
the "exclusionary rule," for two other states other than California have recently changed their policy. In Rickards v. State,
supra, the Supreme Court of Delaware expressly overruled its
previous decisions, which had followed the "orthodox rule," by
reasoning that to exclude illegally obtained evidence was the
most effective way to protect the public against unreasonable
searches and seizures. North Carolina enacted a statute in 1951
that was in direct conflict to its previous decisions admitting such
evidence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
These are the two conflicting views of a very controversial
problem now present in American jurisprudence. Which of the
two will emerge as the ultimate victor? Does either offer a satisfactory solution, or should new theories be inserted into the controversy? Perhaps a more severe punishment of the offending
officer is the answer. The solution of the conflict is in the hands
of the courts and legislatures and only a thorough understanding
of the principles involved will aid in providing the correct solution to the problem.
Raymond P. Knoll

EVIDENCE - WITNESSES - ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY THAT
DEFENDANT IS INSURED. Clayton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 276

S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1955). This is an appeal arising out of an
action for personal injuries incurred by the plaintiff while a passenger in a streetcar operated by the defendant Public Service
Company. An employee of Transit Casualty Company, defendant's insurance carrier, visited the plaintiff on several occasions
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subsequent to the accident and on his first visit took a signed
statement from her. At the trial, upon direct examination of the
employee and upon cross-examination of the plaintiff and her
witnesses, counsel for the defendant introduced and represented
the witness to the jury as a claim agent of the Public Service
Company. Over the objection of defendant's counsel, the plaintiff's lawyer was allowed to ask the employee by whom he was
employed, and the following ensued:
Q. Well, who were ye? "rnloyed by the time this happened?
A. Transit Casualty Company.
Q. And who were you representing when you went out to see
this lady? A. Public Service Company.
Q. Were you ever in their employ? A. No.
Q. But you were representing them when you went out to see
her, is that correct? A. I was.
Q. Would it be possible that you were representing Transit
Casualty Company when you went out to see them?
Thereupon counsel for the defendant objected but his objection
was overruled by the court. The question was re-phrased and
the witness answered in the affirmative. In the course of his
closing argument, plaintiff's attorney recalled to the jury that
the witness was an employee of Transit Casualty Company and
emphasized the fact that, although employed by the insurance
company, he had testified that he represented the Public Service
Company when he went to see the plaintiff. Defendant's counsel
then made a motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the repeated reference to Transit Casualty Company was an attempt
on the part of plaintiff's attorney to inject insurance into the
case and thus prejudice the jury. This appeal assigned as error
the overruling of this motion. The issue presented to the court,
inter alia, was whether or not it was error in a personal injury
suit to permit questions establishing the defendant's witness as
an employee of an insurance company.
Sustaining the ruling of the court below, the court held that
although the questions put to, and the answers made by, the witness brought out the fact that the defendant was insured, the
testimony was admissible in order to establish the credibility of
the witness; was relevant to show the interest of the witness; and
was admissible to bring out who his employer was in order to
show the connection between the witness and a party to the
cause.
It is the general rule that in a personal injury action evidence
that the defendant carries liability insurance is inadmissible.
Ward v. Haralson,196 Ark. 785, 120 S.W.2d 322 (1938) (dictum);
Crawfordv. Alioto, 105 Cal. App. 2d 45, 233 P.2d 148 (1951) (al-
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ternative holding); M. & A. Motor Freight Lines v. Villere, 190
Miss. 848, 1 So.2d 788 (1941). One basis for excluding this type of
evidence is irrelevancy. Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541,
18 N.W.2d 582 (1945); Lytton v. Marion Mfg. Co., 157 N.C. 331,
72 S.E. 1055 (1911). However the more compelling reason for
the exclusion of this type of evidence is stated in Sutton v. Bell,
79 N.J.L. 507, 77 Atl. 42 (1910), at page 43:
. . [Njot
[
that such evidential matter is lacking in relevancy or
devoid of probative force logically considered, but . . . that the
introduction of such facts and inquiries tends in actual operation to
produce a confusion of issues in the mind of the jury and an unfair
prejudice against one of the parties, in excess of, and, indeed, in
the place of, the legitimate probative effect of such evidence....

Courts have held that the wilful introduction of insurance in order to influence the jury is so prejudicial as to constitute grounds
for a new trial even though the trial court had admonished the
jury to disregard such testimony. Watson v. Adams, 187 Ala. 490,
65 So. 528 (1914); Boyne v. Schulte, 222 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. App.
1949).
This strict prohibition against all references to insurance, however, is qualified by certain exceptions. It is never error to allow questions concerning insurance where that fact has a direct
bearing upon the issue in controversy. For example, where the
ownership of an automobile is in issue, the plaintiff may show
the fact that defendant carried insurance on the auto as tending
to prove ownership. Bash v. Hade, 62 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1954) (dictum); Layton v. Cregan & Mallory Co., 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W.
539 (1933), reversed on other grounds on rehearing,252 N.W. 337
(1933). In Olson v. Sharpe, 36 Tenn. App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867
(1953), the court held that to introduce evidence of insurance
in order to establish an agency relationship was not error.
A further exception to the general rule exists where an admission of a party concerning liability includes a reference to
insurance. Jackson v. Ellis, 213 Ark. 826, 212 S.W.2d 715 (1948).
In Garee v. McDonelI, 116 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 561 (1941), the defendant sent a telegram to his insurance carrier admitting his liability for an automobile accident. The court held that, in order to show this admission, evidence concerning the telegram was properly allowed even though
the jury would be informed of the fact that the defendant carried
insurance. In Herschensohnv. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 119 Atl. 705
(1923), where a defendant said "Don't worry, I carry insurance
for that," in answer to the plaintiff's admonition to drive carefully, evidence of the conversation was admitted as tending to
prove the defendant's negligence even though the jury would be
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apprised of the fact that the defendant was covered by liability
insurance. The court said, 119 Atl. at page 705:
When the plaintiff remonstrated with him and admonished him
to be more careful, his reply indicated that he was not concerned
about his recklessness because he was protected by liability insurance. His attitude as disclosed by his words imply that he would
be likely to exercise a less degree of care in operating his automobile
for the reason that an insurance company would be called upon to
pay for any damages occasioned to others by his reckless -and
negligent conduct. Consequently the fact that the defendant carried
liability insurance was competent and important evidence bearing
directly upon his negligence.

But where it is not necessary to refer to insurance in order to
show an admission, and the matter of insurance is severable from
the rest of the statement, it would be error to allow that part
of the admission dealing with insurance to be presented. Anderson v. Mothershead, 19 Cal. App. 2d 97, 64 P.2d 995, 998 (1937)
(dictum).
Another exception to the general rule of inadmissibility of the
-act of insurance is found in situations where an unexpected or
unresponsive reference to insurance is made by a witness to an
otherwise entirely proper question. Gleaton v. Green, 156 F.2d
459 (4th Cir. 1946). In these instances of volunteered remarks
about insurance, courts have refused to grant mistrials if the trial
judge immediately instructed the jury that the question of insurance was not to enter into their deliberations. Hazeltine v. Johnson, 92 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1937).
Testimony exposing the fact of insurance is admissible where
it is sought merely to test the credibility of the witness. Dempsey
v. Goldstein Bros. Amusement Co., 231 Mass. 461, 121 N.E. 429
(1919). In Butcher v. Stull, 82 S.E.2d 278 (W. Va. 1954), the
court allowed cross-examination of an insurance adjuster to show
that he was employed by the defendant's insurance carrier. The
principal case falls within this exception to the general rule of
inadmissibility. Although in the instant case the questions asked
of and the answers made by the witness brought out the fact that
the defendant was insured, the court held, that in order to establish the credibility of the witness his interest could be shown;
notwithstanding the fact that the insurance would be incidently
revealed to the jury.
In view of the various ways in which the existence of insurance
may be elicited from a witness by bringing his testimony under
one of the exceptions to the general rule excluding such evidence,
the strict rule of inadmissibility appears to have become the exception instead of the rule. Moreover, if one takes a realistic
view, it is hard to deny that almost every juror is conversant with
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the fact that liability insurance is widespread and in the case of
automobile owners almost universally procured. Courts, however, have consistently adhered to the general rule of inadmissibility, qualified by the exceptions discussed above. This adherence is sound, for to entirely disregard the doctrine of inadmissibility might tend to incline juries toward awarding excessive
verdicts based upon the presence of the defendant's insurance in
the case rather than the issue of the defendant's negligence.
Manuel A. Sequeira, Jr.
INSURANcE - AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANcE - "HOT ROD"
BEING TOWED CONSIDERED TRAILER WITHIN MEANING OF ExCLU-

SIONARY CLAUSE.-BlIue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Haun, . . . Te ..... ,276
S.W.2d 711 (1954), petition for rehearing denied (1955). The original bill was filed by the plaintiff insurance company seeking
a declaratory judgment on the question whether a towed automobile was a "trailer" within the meaning of a clause in a policy
excluding indemnity while the insured automobile "is used for
the towing of any trailer owned or leased by the insured and not
covered by like insurance in the company." Defendants to the
suit were the insured and others having a claim against the insured by reason of an accident which occurred while the insured
vehicle was towing a "hot rod" racing automobile not independently covered by insurance. The "hot rod" became disengaged
from the towing automobile, veered to the left and collided headon with an approaching car. No part of the insured automobile
struck the other car or was involved in the collision.
The chancellor held that the car being towed was not a trailer
within the terms of the policy. Under the exclusions provisions
of the policy the insurance company was not liable: "(c) . . .
while the automobile is used for the towing of any trailer owned
or leased by the insured and not covered by like insurance in
the company." The court of appeals affirmed the chancellor's decision, reasoning that since there is an ambiguity in the use of
the word trailer, which was of the insurer's own making, two
well-known rules of construction relating to insurance policies
were to be applied: (1) that all ambiguities will be resolved in
favor of the insured, and (2) that all limitations of liability are
to be construed strongly against the insurer. The Supreme Court
of Tennessee reversed the decision of the court of appeals, finding for the insurance company. The court ruled that there could
be no ambiguity in the use of the word trailer since it had been
clearly defined in Waddey v. Maryland Cas. Co., 171 Tenn. 112,
100 S.W.2d 984 (1937), which definition still controlled, there
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being no subsequent judicial or legislative attempts to define the
term.
In the Waddey case, supra, the insurance policy excluded indemnity while the insured car was used for towing or propelling
any trailer or any vehicle used as a trailer, but permitted "incidental assistance to a stranded automobile." The driver of the
insured car permitted two young boys, who were stranded along
the road, to attach their child-made wagon to his car. An accident occurred when the car started downhill and the boy steering the wagon lost control, crashed into a telephone pole and was
injured. The court held that since the vehicle being towed was
not an automobile, it obviously did not fall within the exception
provided for in the policy. The court decided, however, that this
wagon, made from the frame of a small buggy and mounted on
four T-model Ford wheels with no tires and no bed or seat, except a plank extending from front to back axles, was a "trailer"
as defined by Webster's International Dictionary: "A vehicle or
one in a succession of vehicles hauled, usually, by some other
vehicle." 100 S.W.2d at page 986.
It appears to be well settled that the insurer under a trailer
exclusionary clause in an automobile insurance policy is exempt
from liability regardless of whether or not the attached trailer
caused or contributed to the accident. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bass, 192 Tenn. 588, 241 S.W.2d 568 (1951). Thus,
in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cross, 112 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 701 (1940), the court held that an automobile
liability policy, containing a provision suspending the insurance
coverage so long as the automobile was towing a trailer, did not
cover injuries to the leg of the occupant of a truck which passed
the insured vehicle while it was parked with a trailer attached,
notwithstanding the fact that the occupant struck his leg against
the fender of the insured automobile and not against the trailer.
The decision was based on the ground that the insurance was
wholly suspended while the automobile was used for towing the
trailer. In Adams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 162 Miss. 237, 139 So.
453 (1932), the court ruled that even though there was no causal
connection between the attachment of the trailer to the truck
and the injury to the plaintiff, this would not be sufficient to make
the insurance company liable. Substantially the same decision was
rendered in Coolidge v. StandardAcc. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 716,
300 Pac. 885 (1931), where the court stated that the attached
trailer increased the peril of operating the automobile along the
highway, and the insurer's exemption from liability did not depend upon the attached trailer becoming the cause of the accident or even contributing to the casualty. The reasoning under-
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lying these decisions is set out at some length in Conner v. Union
Automobile Ins. Co., 122 Cal. App. 105, 9 P.2d 863 (1932), at page
866:
The attachment of a trailer to the automobile while it was being
operated is clearly an added hazard. There appears to be good reason
why an insurance company may lawfully limit its liability to the
operation of the insured machine free from the use of an attached
trailer which increases the hazard.
The duration of the suspension of liability under these provisions includes casual stops enroute. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Bachmann, 256 App. Div. 1042, 10 N.Y.S.2d 704
(4th Dep't 1939). The exclusionary clause did not apply in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Aguayo, 29 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (alternative holding), where the truck and trailer had arrived at their
destination so that the trailer was no longer actually being towed,
the court stating that the word "towing" signified movement.
In a Pennsylvania case, the insured claimed the exclusionary
provision should not apply because the trailer in question and
another loaded on the bed of his truck were being hauled as
freight in the normal course of business. The court, however, re-

lieved the insurance company from liability, holding that the
exclusionary provision still applied. Speca v. Bucci Constr. Co.,

139 Pa. Super. 76, 11 A.2d 560 (1940). A further extension of
this rule of non-liability was reached in Pennsylvania Indemnity
Corp. v. Kurtz, 167 Md. 38, 172 Atl. 607 (1934), where there was
testimony by plaintiff's witness to the effect that nothing was attached to the insured vehicle at the time of the accident. This
same witness, however, testified that before the accident he saw
the truck backed up against the curb, and immediately after the
accident he saw a circus wagon attached to the truck about to
be moved out. This was considered sufficient under the circumstances disclosed by the record, to show, as a matter of law, that
the truck was being operated or manipulated to tow a wagon
within the exclusionary provision of the liability policy. The decision would seem to indicate that the mere intention to attach
a trailer brings the insured automobile within the exclusionary
provision of the policy.
The question whether an attached vehicle is in fact a trailer or
is being used as a trailer has arisen many times. In MoffItt v. State
Automobile Ins. Ass'n, 140 Neb. 578, 300 N.W. 837 (1941), it was
held that a hay grinder mounted upon four wheels and which
was being drawn by a truck upon a public highway, was a trailer
or vehicle within the common and ordinary meaning of these
words.
In some states a trailer is defined by statute. A Florida statute
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provides that a trailer shall include all four-wheeled vehicles,
and a semi-trailer all two-wheeled vehicles, coupled to or drawn
by a motor vehicle. FLA. STAT. AN. § 320.01 (1943). In Poole v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138 (1937), the policy
provided that the truck in question shall be insured for the towing of any trailer only when such use is definitely declared and
rated. The exception made no reference to semi-trailers. In holding the insurance company liable the court ruled that, construing
the terms of the policy most strongly against the company, the
failure to mention the semi-trailer in that part of the policy made
it permissible for a truck insured under the policy to tow a semitrailer and be insured though the semi-trailer was not definitely
declared and rated.
In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cross, supra, a Texas statute providing for the registration of motor vehicles, expressly distinguished
a trailer from a semi-trailer. The court pointed out, however, that
the classification for the purpose of registration fees did not throw
much light on the meaning of the term as used in an insurance
policy. In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Aguayo, supra, it was held that
a concrete mixer which was attached to a truck at the time of
the injury to a third party was not a trailer under the applicable
California law. The court stated that, in writing the insurance
policy, the insurer was careful to exclude from coverage trailers
and semi-trailers which were defined in the California Vehicle
Code, but it did not exclude special mobile equipment, also defined in the Vehicle Code. Under this view it could be assumed,
therefore, that the insurer was willing to assume the added risk.
In many of the cases discussed above as well as the instant
case, the policy further provides for a suspension of the trailer
exclusionary provision if the vehicle towed is a utility trailer and
not a home, office, store, display or passenger trailer. This added
provision seems to further complicate the reduction of these exclusionary provisions to clear and certain application. Such a provision is discussed in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hoffman, 75 Ariz. 103,
252 P.2d 82, 84 (1952) (dictum). The policy involved in that case
defined utility trailer as ".. . a trailer not so described, if designated for use with a private passenger automobile, if not being
used with another type automobile, and if not a home, office,
store, display or passenger trailer." 252 P.2d at page 84. The court
held such a policy to embrace all trailers of every description
except those which are classified as home, office, store, display or
passenger trailers.
The general proposition that where the terms of an insurance
policy will bear two interpretations, that one will be adopted
which sustains the claim for indemnity, is not contradicted in
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any of the cases which have been discussed. In keeping with this
rule the courts have regarded the term "trailer" as being susceptible of only one meaning. They then have proceeded to determine
whether that meaning embraces the particular vehicle involved in
the case. This was the procedure followed by the court in the instant case, and it is submitted that the decision that the "hot rod"
was a trailer was reasonable in view of the controlling definition
which had been previously adopted by the court.
James E. Sullivan

PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CoRPoRATIoNS-"DoBUSINESS" AND DUE PRocEss.--Jenkins v. Dell PublishingCo.,

ING

130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955). In an action for invasion of
privacy the defendant publisher moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that it was not doing business in Pennsylvania. Its magazines were distributed in Pennsylvania by an
independent contractor who bought them from the defendant for
resale. However, the defendant regularly employed traveling
representatives to serve as liaison men between the corporation
and its local distributors, to promote its sales, and to create good
will in the state. These men did not sell magazines themselves;
nor did they maintain office space or telephone service in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1011 (B) (C) (Supp.
1954) provides that when an unregistered foreign corporation
enters the state to perform ".

.

. a series of similar acts for the

purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit.. .," that corporation may be sued in Pennsylvania on causes of action arising out
of its activities in the state.
The question presented by this motion was whether defendant's
contacts with the state were such as to make it reasonable for
the court to assume jurisdiction over the defendant without offending the Fourteenth Amendment's due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
The court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
systematic and continuous activities of the defendant's representatives made it reasonable to require the corporation to defend this suit. It emphasized the statement of the Supreme Court
in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), that
-presence in the state has never been doubted where ".... the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and
;systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on... ." 326 U.S.
.at page 317.
Historically, a corporation was believed to have no existence
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outside the state of its incorporation, Bank v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 517, 587 (1839) (dictum), and could not be sued for a personal judgment outside that state since jurisdiction depended
upon the presence of the defendant before the court. Accordingly,
various theories were devised to acquire jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. Since a state could prevent these corporations from
doing local, or intrastate business without previously consenting
to accept service of process, they either consented or were held to
have implied their consent by conducting business within the
state. This fiction of implied consent failed when the defendant
was engaged solely in interstate commerce, which the state could
not prevent. See FIELD AND KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC
COURSE

nv CrVL PROCEDURE, 796-798

(1953). To satisfy the ap-

parent need for the defendant's presence, the Court in Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917), enunciated the "presence theory," under which a foreign corporation
was regarded as being amenable to suit f its business was done
in a manner and to an extent which would warrant the inference
that it was present in the state.
Pointing out that a corporation has no existence except through
the activities of its representatives, the Court in InternationalShoe
Co. v. Washington, supra, rejected the "presence theory" to deal
with the real problem: whether those activities in a state make it
reasonable to hold the foreign corporation amenable to suit there.
In that case the corporation's business in the State of Washington
was confined to sales in interstate commerce. However, it employed salesmen to solicit orders and display its shoes in sample
rooms. The Court held that these systematic and continuous activities of the corporation's salesmen provided the necessary contacts with the state so that the maintenance of the suit would not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
326 U.S. at page 316. The Court pointed out that the privilege of
carrying on activities in a state may give rise to obligations, and
"....

so far as those obligations arise out of... the activities within

the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to
a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be
said to be undue." 326 U.S. at page 319.
As the concurring opinion in the InternationalShoe case anticipated, conflicting results have been reached by the courts in applying the general standard of reasonableness. It must be noted, however, that many decisions cannot follow the test completely, either
because the state service statute is not broad enough, Chapman v.
Telex, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1954), or because the
statute has been narrowly construed by the state courts, Pulson
v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948). A state
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is not obliged to expand its jurisdiction, Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952) (dictum), rehearing
denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952), and the construction given to the
service statutes by the state courts is controlling on the federal
courts. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., supra.
While the words of the Court in the InternationalShoe case indicate that it would uphold jurisdiction where the defendant's activities are systematic and continuous and give rise to the liability sued
on, some courts have continued to apply a technical and unrealistic
test of what constitutes "doing business." On the authority of
Greenv. ChicagoBurlington and Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907)
-which was called "extreme" although the Court declined to
overrule it in InternationalHarvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
579, 586 (1914) (dictum)-some courts have indicated that the
mere solicitation of orders to be accepted outside the state does not
constitute "doing business" for jurisdictional purposes. See
Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954); Landell v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 98 F. Supp. 479, 482 (D. D.C. 1951) (dictum). Where this is
actually held, the facts usually show that the injury did not result
from the corporation's solicitation activities within the state, Fiorella v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 89 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Pa. 1950); or
the injury occurred outside the state, Zuber v. PennsylvaniaR.R.,
82 F. Supp. 670, 678 (N.D. Ga. 1949) (dictum); or the solicitation activities are carried on by independent contractors and not
by agents or employees of the defendant, Schmidt v. Esquire,Inc.,
supra. Solicitation alone has been held sufficient where the injury results from the solicitation activities of defendant's employees. Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra.
It is well established that solicitation plus some additional activities subjects a foreign corporation to state jurisdiction, whether the facts are tested to see if the defendant is "doing business,"
InternationalHarvesterCo. v. Kentucky, supra, or by the "reasonableness" norm of the InternationalShoe case. Some additional
activities on the part of a corporation's representatives which the
courts have considered important in sustaining jurisdiction are:
maintaining a local office where employees occasionally sell tickets
themselves, Landell v. NorthernPac. Ry., supra; office space, telephone service, bank account, and complaint adjustment by local
employees, Kendrick v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 98 F. Supp. 372
(E.D. Pa. 1949); service representative repairs and demonstrates
products, and services delinquent accounts, Jensen v. Van Norman Co., 105 F. Supp. 778 (D. Minn. 1952); inspecting stock and
displays, demonstrating products, investigating complaints, conducting sales meetings, driving defendant's automobile, Radford
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v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 128 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn.
1955); authorizing agents to receive payment in money, drafts or
checks, InternationalHarvesterCo. v. Kentucky, supra; giving advice on the use of defendant's product and generally promoting
good will, Dufek v. Roux Distributing Co., 125 F. Supp. 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), and Convery v. Clairol, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 29
(E.D. Pa. 1954) where, in addition, defendant's agents maintained
a sales headquarters and a telephone answering service.
In the above cases the activities were carried on by agents or
representatives in the defendant's employ. An employment relationship is not always necessary under the "solicitation plus" rule
of the above cases. Thus, jurisdiction may be sustained even
though the defendant sells its products to an independent contractor for distribution, if the defendant exercises a substantial
amount of control over the distributor's activities. Kahn v. Maico
Co., 216 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1954); Thomas v. Hudson Sales Corp.,
204 Md. 450, 105 A.2d 225 (1954). However, it has been held
that a foreign corporation which clearly controls its subsidiary in
a state is not suable in that state unless an agency relationship
between parent and subsidiary is established, as the subsidiary is
a distinct corporate entity. Harris v. Deere & Co., 128 F. Supp.
799 (E.D.N.C. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 223 F.2d 161 (1955); Favell-Utley Realty Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp., 94 F. Supp. 96
(N.D. Cal. 1950).
Finally, the defendant corporation may be suable if the activities of its agents in a state are systematic and continuous and give
rise to the liability sued on, even though there is no solicitation.
The principal case sustained jurisdiction on sales promotion work
alone. The regular, continuous and systematic purchase of large
quantities of coal by defendant's agents was held sufficient to
make the company amenable to service of process in Star Elchorn
Coal Co. v. Red Ash PocahontasCoal Co., 102 F. Supp. 258 (E.D.
Ky. 1951). In Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 99 F. Supp.
237 (W.D. Ark. 1951), defendant, a foreign corporation, owned
and operated a large game preserve in Arkansas for the entertainment of its guests and demonstration of its rifles, which were also
displayed in state competition by expert marksmen in its employ.
These sales promotion activities, being both systematic and continuous, were held to make it reasonable to require defense of an
action brought against the defendant in Arkansas. In Murphy v.
Arrow S. S. Co., 124 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa. 1954), the defendant
was held amenable to service although the activities of its
agents were confined to docking at Philadelphia seven times
in four years. Jurisdiction was upheld in Orange-CrushGrapico
Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 128 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1955),
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where the defendant's agents made "regular, systematic and frequent" trips to Alabama to promote sales through such activities
as sales meetings, schools, demonstrations, advertisements, product analysis, plant and machinery inspection, negotiating and
making agreements for new franchises. Opposed to this trend is
Cogburn v. MacFaddenPublications,Inc., 129 F. Supp. 535 (E.D.
S.C. 1955), substantially the same as the principal case on its
facts in that sales promotion work was done by defendant's representatives, while sales were made to independent distributors.
In Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953), the
defendant's magazines were distributed through independent cantractors, but two circulation road men were employed by defendant to check retail outlets in Florida. The Court returned the
case to the district court to determine the jurisdictional issue.
Justice Black, dissenting in part, chose to decide that question at
once, and expressed the opinion that the activities of the circulation men show that the defendant was "doing business" in the
state under the "basic fairness" test of the InternationalShoe case.
He suggested that if the defendant will suffer in defending an action
in a foreign jurisdiction, the way is clear for the court to grant a
change of venue "in the interest of justice" under 28 U.S.C. §
1404 (a) (1952). 345 U.S. at page 671.
In Tiner v. Insulrock Corp., 120 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Ark.
1954) (dictum), the court suggested: "Perhaps the best method
of determining whether or not a corporation... is doing business
in the state is to look to the results."
The principal case, in sustaining jurisdiction although the defendant's activities were confined to mere sales promotion, seems
to be in line with the modern trend of authority. The recent decisions indicate that the courts are gradually disregarding technical distinctions to consider the question of jurisdiction in terms
of reasonableness and due process, thus followng the lead of the
Supreme Court. It is submitted that for a company maintaining
contacts in many states the defense of an action in the most remote corner of America is no more inconvenient than the trip to
the county court house may have been a hundred years ago. To a
practical businessman, a corporation whose product is sold in a
state is doing business there. Such a pragmatic, common sense
test has great merit. When a corporation profits from its activities
in a state it should not be heard to argue the injustice of its being
called upon to assume corresponding obligations in that state.
Edward S. Mraz
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-Lane
v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App.
2d 272, 278 P.2d 723 (1955). The defendant processed a can of
ready-to-eat chicken and labeled it "boned chicken." The can
was sold to a retailer who sold it to the plaintiff. When purchasing, the plaintiff relied on the label on the can and also on
an advertisement of the defendant in a local newspaper. The
advertisement stated that cans of chicken of this type contained
no bones. The can purchased in fact contained a hidden chicken
bone which became lodged in the plaintiff's throat, causing
severe personal injuries. The plaintiff brought suit for damages
for breach of an express warranty directly against the processor,
C. A. Swanson & Sons. While admitting the existence of a warranty of fitness for human consumption, the defendant contended
that the label merely described the manner of preparation and
packing, and that it did not constitute an express warranty
that the can was free from bones. The defendant did not raise
the issue of privity. The trial court held that there was no ex-

CANNED FOOD.

press warranty.
On appeal, the question for the decision of the court was
whether or not the label on the can constituted an express
warranty. The appellate court reversed and held primarily that
the label on the can supported by the newspaper advertisement
constituted an express warranty which had been breached by
the defendant.
In the early common law, a warranty was based on an action
on the case for deceit, a tort claim, and it provided part of the
background for the development of the action of special assumpsit. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8
(1888). In Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778),
where the defendant represented as sound a horse which he sold
to the plaintiff, and where in fact the horse was diseased, the
action of assumpsit was first applied. Thus, basing the modern
liability of a seller on contract as well as on tort can easily
be explained.
When the seller expressly promised that some quality in a
good was present, and when he received a sufficient consideration for it, he entered into a contract. As there was an action
in contract for breach of contract, along with it came the requirement of privity. 30 NOTRE DAME LAW. 173 (1954).
Privity and its effect on the parties to a contract have been
important considerations for many years. The basic, underlying
principle governing the liability of a manufacturer to an ultimate

consumer was set out in a landmark case, Winterbottom v.
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Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), where the
plaintiff contracted with a third party to drive the latter's coach.
The defendant contracted with the same third party to keep the
coach in good repair. The coach collapsed and the plaintiff was
injured. The court held that lack of privity between the plaintiff
and the defendant prevented a recovery. Two New York cases,
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916), and Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455
(1852), developed a new theory regarding a manufacturer's
liability to a consumer. The New York courts allowed recoveries
in both of these cases on the basis of negligence in the preparation of an "inherently dangerous article." The issue of privity
was thus circumvented. The court in the instant case ignored
the question of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant,
demonstrating the modern tendency. Far-reaching changes in
business methods and markets have brought about this variation.
See generally, PROSsER, TORTS § 83 (1941).
Since the manufacturer and the consumer do not actually contract, some modern courts still hold to the privity requirement
and refuse to extend the warranty to the consumer. J. I. Case
Threshing Mach. Co. v. Dulworth, 216 Ky. 637, 287 S.W. 994
(1925). In Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.
1937), the plaintiff was injured by the shattering of a glass
windshield. The defendant prepared circulars which it distributed to its dealers and which assured the shatterproof
quality of the windshield. Even though the plaintiff relied on
the representations, the court denied recovery because the lack
of privity negated the existence of a warranty. Contra, Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). However,
the court in Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683,
288 N.W. 309 (1939), held the manufacturer liable for the breach
of an express warranty. The warranty that the car's roof was
seamless was set out in an advertisement. The difference between
this case and the Chanin case, supra, seems to be that in the
former, the warranty was made to the dealer, where in the latter,
the court felt that the advertisement was made to the plaintiff
himself.
Cases dealing mainly with food have led to a strong minority
position, indicating a more recent trend. They have endorsed
the rule that the processor is liable even without privity on the
warranty theory. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775,
176 N.W. 382 (1920); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, I39
Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). cf Southwest Ice & Dairy
Products Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla. 279, 220 P.2d 257
(1950). This view, which gives the consumer a right of action
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against the original wrongdoer also will give him a more valuable
judgment since small corner-grocerymen might not be able to pay
any damages that may be awarded. Comment, 23 CALIF. L. REV.

621, 625 (1935).
Considering this allowance of recovery despite the lack of
privity, if the manufacturer made an express warranty an even
stronger case could be made out against him. In earlier cases,
the seller must have intended to make a warranty, express or
implied. The court in Barnett v. Stanton, 2 Ala. 181, 184 (1841),
stated that no matter how positive the representation of the
seller was, it would only be an expression of belief or an opinion
unless it was intended as a stipulation that the property was of
the quality represented. Today, however, the intent of the seller
is immaterial. Chamberlain Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 51
Cal. App. 2d 520, 125 P.2d 113 (1942) (dictum) (decided under
the UNiFosm SALES ACT). See 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 197-201
(rev. ed. 1948).
In a gradual process of increased readiness to find warranties
existing, it has been held that an express warranty need not
contain the word "warranty," nor is any technical set of terminology required. Belt Seed Co. v. Mitchelhill Seed Co., 236 Mo.
App. 142, 153 S.W.2d 106, 109 (1941). In comparison with the
requirements demanded in the Barnett case, supra, the definition of an express warranty in the UxiFoEm SALES ACT has made

the finding of a warranty an easier task and probably has given
the courts a more uniform guide. In Section 12 of the Act it is
stated:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating
to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such
affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods,
and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be
a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a
warranty.

The use of large-scale national and local advertising by the
manufacturer has given rise to express warranties. An advertisement in a local newspaper that certain seed corn was 95
per cent germinative by test was held to be an express warranty
in Baumgartnerv. Glesener, 171 Minn. 289, 214 N.W. 27 (1927).
The plaintiff in Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182,
186 S.W.2d 603 (1945), demonstrated such strong reliance on a
newspaper advertisement that he took the paper to the defendant's store when he purchased a stepladder. A recovery was
allowed for the breach of an express warranty made in the
advertisement when the ladder later proved to be defective.
In a similar case, Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App.
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Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1943), the plaintiff, after discussing the apparatus with the defendant's salesman, purchased
a chinning bar. Directions in the advertising matter advised that
the bar would safely sustain 250 lbs. Injury resulted to the plaintiff who weighed 170 lbs. when the bar fell after only five months
use. In allowing recovery, the court held that the defendant
adopted as a warranty the representations of the manufacturer
made in the circular.
Analagous to newspaper advertisements and printed circulars
as express warranties are labels on cans and containers. Although recovery was denied because of the lack of privity in
Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949), the
label on a can of antifreeze was held by the court to be an express warranty. After citing Baumgartner v. Glesener, supra, to
strengthen the decision, a tag attached to a package of seed stating that the seed was 98 per cent pure was held to be an express
warranty in Mallery v. Northfield Seed Co., 196 Minn. 129, 264
N.W. 573, 574 (1936). Careful note must be taken of the words
and phrases used on each particular label, and the application of
Section 12 of the UNIFORM SALES ACT is also important.
Though a similar case holding a label on a can of food to be
an express warranty could not be found, the instant case seems
to be indicative of the modern trend. A purchaser should be
allowed to rely strictly on such descriptive names as "boned
chicken." By permitting a consumer to recover and making the
manufacturer liable as an insurer, regardless of privity, courts
will place the responsibility for injury with the only party to
the transaction capable of controlling the situation. Advocating
strict legal sanctions will promote higher ethics in advertising
and discourage careless manufacture. Food processors especially
will tend to keep their advertising truthful and take particular
notice of their packing methods. While individual jurisdictions will continue to follow their respective theories, the grip
of public policy and the demands of social justice will probably
move an increasing number of courts toward strict liability for
the manufacturer.
Paul M. Kraus

TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-PuNITIVE DAMAGES INCLUDIBLE IN GROSS INCOME.-Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348

U.S. 426 (1955). This is a consolidation of two cases, the other de-

fendant being the William Goldman Theatres, Inc. Both cases have
distinct factual situations, yet the issue involved is the same.
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In the principal case a suit was brought by Glenshaw Glass Co.
against another company and demand was made for exemplary
damages for fraud, and treble damages for injury to its business
by reason of a violation of the federal antitrust laws. A settlement
was reached and Glenshaw Glass received a sum which represented payment of punitive damages. This amount was not reported as income for the tax year involved. In the William Goldman Theatres case, the theatre corporation sued another corporation under the federal antitrust laws and recovered treble damages, a third of which constituted lost profits. It reported as income the amount equal to its lost profits, but not the sum representing punitive damages. In both instances the Commissioner
asserted a deficiency claiming as taxable the total sum recovered
less any deductible legal fees. The Tax Court in both cases held
for the taxpayer disallowing as income the treble or punitive
damages. The Court of Appeals, after consolidating the two cases,
affirmed the Tax Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The issue presented to the Court by both cases was whether
money received as exemplary damages for fraud, or as the punitive two-thirds porion of a treble damage antitrust recovery,
must be reported as gross income under Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 22 (a), 53 STAT. 9 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a)). The
Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that the sums received as punitive damages were gross income within the meaning of the code.
It is conceded by the taxpayer in the principal case that the
problem is not of a constitutional nature, but one of determining
from the revenue code the meaning of gross income. The Supreme
Court, in the early case of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920), attempted to define the concept of income by stating at
page 207:
"Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined," provided it be understood to include
profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets....

In Bowers v. Taft, 20 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1927), aff'd, 278 U.S. 470
(1929), an attempt was made by Judge Learned Hand in a concurring opinion, to define income when he stated, 20 F.2d at page
564:
No increase in value not realized in cash can be taxed as income
under the Sixteenth Amendment; that was very deliberately decided
in Eisner v. Macomber.... If it is important, I suggest that the
language of the Amendment itself gives Congress power to lay
"taxes on incomes," not on persons.

Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918), in dis-
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cussing the term income stated, 245 U.S. at page 425:
But it is not necessarily true that income means the same thing
in the Constitution and the act. A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used.
In United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), the
Court rejected judicial definitions as to the meaning of income
and stressed a "plain popular meaning" rule. This case is commented on in an article by Surrey and Warren, The Income Tax
Project of the American Law Institute, 66 HAv. L. REv. 761, 771
(1953), where income is described in this manner:
The Supreme Court has recognized the futility of attempting to
capture the concept of income and confine it within a phrase. In
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. the Court explicitly abandoned

the search for a definition, and succeeding cases have not revived
the search. The courts have given a wide scope to the income tax,
but have recognized that the borderline content of "income" must
be determined case by case. Essentially the concept of income is a
flexible one, with the result in a particular case being determined
by the interplay of common usage, accounting concepts, administrative goals, and finally judicial reaction to these forces. Each force
and judicial reaction in turn reflects an underlying judgment as to
what types of receipts should be subject to a tax imposed on

"income."
Despite this rejection of a judicial definition as to the meaning
of income, exceptions, not found in the code, continued to be
imposed by the courts. In Central R. Co. v. Commissioner, 79
F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935), a penalty was declared not to be income.
This proposition was followed in Highland Farms Corp. v. Commissioner,42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940), when the Board of Tax Appeals
stated, at page 1322:
A penalty imposed by law does not meet the test of taxable
income set forth in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, as "the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined ......

Yet in Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States, 123 Ct.
Cl. 509, 107 F. Supp. 941 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953),
there is dictum to the effect that punitive damages are taxable.
The court stated, at 107 F. Supp. 944:
The treatment, for income tax purposes, of a penalty, so far as
the receiver of the penalty is concerned, is analogous to the treatment of damages received by him for some violation of his rights.
When damages are recovered in lieu of profits or income to which
the taxpayer would have been entitled, but for the violation of his
rights, they are taxable to him as income.

In Commissioner v. Obear-NesterGlass Co., 217 F.2d 56 (7th Cir.
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1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955), the dictum of the Park &
Tilford case, supra,was followed, and punitive damages were held
to be includible in gross income. The court reasoned that the
respondent had realized an economic gain and Congress had
failed to provide a specific exclusion for these damages.
The decision in the principal case strengthens the "plain popular meaning" rule expounded in the Kirby Lumber Co. case as
opposed to the limited definition given income in Eisner v. Macomber. Hence the decision in the instant case is in full accord
with more recent Supreme Court decisions wherein the Court
has not been able to find any statutory authority for the inclusion
or exclusion of a particular item in gross income. Thus, money
obtained by extortion was held to be includible, in Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); and, in General American Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955), "insider profits" received by a corporation pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were held includible.
The term "gross income" as defined in the revenue code is too
inclusive to permit the courts to exclude punitive damages without any sanction by Congress. In reference to gross income as
defined in Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 2 2 (a), 53 STAT. 9 (now INT.
REV.CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a)), the Supreme Court in Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), stated at page 334:
The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of
Congress to use the full measure of its taxing power within those
definable categories.

This interpretation of gross income, found also in the principal
case and the General American Investors case, appears to construe the statutory phrase as broadly as the wording found in the
Sixteenth Amendment. Hence, if the statutory meaning is as
wide in scope as there is constitutional power, the courts have
to apply a test broad in meaning as to what is income, for the
Court in the Clifford case, supra, clearly states that the courts
must effectuate the full measure of the taxing power. It only
follows that if the courts impose limitations on the term "gross
income" the wishes of the legislature are not being followed.
The arguments propounded in favor of excluding punitive damages from gross income are based on the following theories: 1)
punitive damages are not income, but penalties; 2) an admission
that most large sums recovered as punitive damages result from a
treble damage recovery under the antitrust law, and that this
feature of the legislation is designed to reward those who bring
suit under this law. Therefore if this recovery is taxed the incentive to file suit is lessened.
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The second argument admits that the purpose behind the antitrust legislation should modify the otherwise sweeping language
of the statutory definition of "gross income." INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 61 (a). If this is allowed, however, the taxing power of
Congress would be curtailed by statutes clearly not intended to
be in pari materia with the revenue code. It follows therefore
that antitrust legislation should not be construed with taxing
statutes in order to create an artificial exclusion for punitive damages. See Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F2d 56,
61-62 (7th Cir. 1954).
As to the first argument, the question of whether or not the
term income, for tax purposes, should include a penalty must be
answered. The new code defines gross income as ".... all income
from whatever source derived . .. ," yet this section makes no
mention of a penalty. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a). A penalty,

therefore, is a judicial exclusion written into the code by the
courts. This is error in view of the broad, all inclusive language
of § 61 (a); hence the term gross income should include penalties.
See 217 F.2d 56, 59.
After rejecting the rule of Eisner v. Macomber and accepting
the standard employed by the Supreme Court in the Kirby Lumber Co. case, could the Court reasonably hold that punitive damages are not income within the meaning of the revenue code?
Upon receipt of the punitive damages, there is an increase in the
net worth of the corporation without any deductions or exclusions, and hence a negative answer should be given to this question. These monies, therefore, should be included within the gross
income of the corporation upon the filing of its tax return, unless
they are expressly excluded by Congress. To date Congress has
not sanctioned the exclusion of punitive damages. See however,
SURREY AND WARREN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 156 (1955 ed.)
where the following is stated:
The House Ways and Means Committee in its consideration of
the 1954 Code had specifically decided not to exempt punitive
damages, Supplemental Memorandum of Gov't, p. 8, in Glenshaw
Glass case.
In conclusion, if punitive damages are to be excluded from

gross income the decision should be made by Congress as a matter of policy.
J. Robert Geiman

UNEMPLOYMENT INStmANcE-PUBLC WELFARE-RIGHiT OF WoRKERs TEMPORARILY UNEMPLOYED AS A RESULT OF A STRIKE TO RE-
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CEIVE UNEMPLOYIVENT COMPENSATION. - Snook v. Int'l Harvester
Co.,. . . Ky.. . ., 276 S.W.2d 658 (1955). The plaintiffs were em-

ployed in the foundry of the International Harvester Company
plant in Louisville, Kentucky, which also employed machinists.
The foundry workers and the machinists were each represented
by different labor unions, operated under different labor contracts, and maintained separate seniority and vacation lists and
personnel records. The foundry and machine shop were housed in
separate buildings located on the same premises, but from a production standpoint, they were closely integrated. A strike by the
machine shop employees caused the temporary unemployment of
the foundry workers although they were not directly involved in
the strike. Upon application for unemployment benefits, the Unemployment Insurance Commission decided that the foundry
workers were not entitled to compensation. The decision of the
Commission was affirmed by the circuit court. On appeal to the
Kentucky Supreme Court, the question presented was whether
the foundry employees of the International Harvester Company,
who were laid off because of a strike by the machine shop employees at the Louisville plant, were entitled to unemployment
compensation under the Kentucky Unemployment Compensation
Act. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 341.005 (Baldwin 1943). Section 341.360
of the Act provides that no worker shall be paid unemployment
benefits if:
(1) A strike or other bona fide labor dispute which caused
him to leave or lose his employment is in active progress in the
establishment in which he is or was employed....

The court of appeals held that the machine shop and foundry
were so integrated and operated in such close proximity that
they in effect constituted a single establishment within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act, thereby excluding
the foundry workers from unemployment benefits since a labor
dispute was in existence "in the establishment" where they were
employed.
The purpose of unemployment insurance is to allow compensation for a limited period of time to those capable of working
and available for work who are involuntarily unemployed
through no fault of their own. A problem arises, however, when
the courts try to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
unemployment. A failure of grocery department employees to
cross a picket line maintained by striking members of a meat
cutters union was held to be a voluntary leaving of work resulting in disqualification from unemployment insurance benefits.
Beaman v. Safeway Stores Inc., 78 Ariz. 195, 277 P.2d 1010
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(1954). In W. R. Grace & Co. v. CaliforniaEmployment Comm'n,

24 Cal.2d 720, 151 P.2d 215 (1944), it was held, inter alia, that
longshoremen who stopped work at a point where striking employees of a clerks' union were employed, were voluntarily unemployed and therefore not entitled to compensation. A refusal
of members of the C.I.O. to cross picket lines of striking members
of the A.F. of L. was held to be a voluntary act of leaving work
and refusal of unemployment benefits was ruled proper in
Brown v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Bd., 189 Md.
233, 55 A.2d 696 (1947). Again, in General Motors Corp. v. Appeal Bd., 321 Mich. 724, 34 N.W.2d 497 (1948), reversing on
rehearing,321 Mich. 604, 33 N.W.2d 90 (1948), it was decided that
an employee who was a die maker, working in a separate and
distinct unit, and who was laid off because of a strike called by
another union in the plant, was voluntarily unemployed and
hence was rightfully denied compensation.
The courts are in agreement that those workers who are actively participating in a labor dispute and consequently laid
off should be denied unemployment benefits. However, there is
disagreement among the courts in cases where there are two
plants under one management in close proximity to each other
and a labor dispute at one plant causes unemployment at the
other. In the instant case, where the foundry workers were
employed in a building separated from the striking machinists,
though close by, the court denied unemployment benefits because the foundry workers were employed in the same establishment as the strikers. As to what constitutes an "establishment"
or "factory," there is a tendency to limit the meaning of these
terms to a particular factory or establishment. However, the
meaning of the terms has been extended to cover several plants
if they are within reasonably close proximity and are functionally integrated. In Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298
N.W. 87 (1941), a labor dispute in the Dodge main plant in the
Detroit area halted work in other Dodge plants located within
11 miles of the main plant. All employees, those who assumed
an active interest in the dispute and those who did not participate in any manner, were denied unemployment benefits. The
Supreme Court of Michigan applied the "functional integrality"
test and held that all the Dodge plants were so synchronized as
to constitute one establishment within the provisions of the
Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act. All employees were
therefore directly interested in the labor dispute because it
would affect their wages, hours of employment, and conditions
of work. The Wisconsin court applied this test in Spielmann v.
Industrial Comm'n, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N.W. 1 (1940), and de-
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cided that a strike at the Kenosha plant, which stopped work
at the Milwaukee plant, was a strike involving a single establishment because of the physical proximity, functional integrality,
and general unity of the two plants; on this basis unemployment
benefits were denied. Each plant however was 40 miles distant;
each had its own wage and labor contract; they had separate
seniority and service records; and each was represented by its
own union. Also, the contract negotiations of one plant were
done independently from the other; the employees in one plant
had no standing in the other plant; each plant had its own hiring and firing department; and the employer-employee relationship of each plant was distinct. The Wisconsin court therefore
attacked the problem by considering whether the units were a
single enterprise from the viewpoint of management. In Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P.2d 707
(1950), the court held the company's state-wide system of three
plants constituted a single establishment and refused compensation to workers laid off in one plant because of a strike in one of
the other plants.
The "functional integrality" test could possibly be extended to
embrace an entire industry as distinct from a single employer,
for it is realistic that many enterprises, whether independently
owned or not, are so integrated that a labor dispute at one plant
will affect another. The court, when confronted with the problem
as a result of the strike called at the Ford plant at Dearborn,
Michigan, rejected this test and adopted the "geographical" test
to permit a recovery of benefits. Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231
Minn. 68, 42 N.W.2d 576 (1950). The strike at the Ford plant
in Dearborn, Michigan caused the unemployment of Ford employees at St. Paul, Minnesota. The Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected the "functional integrality" theory as an absolute
test and stated that the following consideration should be of
prime importance: whether the unit is a separate establishment
from the standpoint of employment and not from the standpoint
of management. In determining this inquiry, the court listed a
number of items to be taken into consideration: hiring and discharging of employees; relationship between local unions; extent
of seniority rights; "bumping" rights; payment to unemployment
compensation fund; and who called the strike. However, the
Supreme Court of Georgia in Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie,
207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950), extended the application of
the "functional integrality" test to deny unemployment benefits
to Ford workers laid off at Hopeville, Georgia, because of the same
strike that was involved in the Nordling case, supra. The court
said, 62 S.E.2d at page 214:
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on any basis of reason and logic that the mere
regardless of the distance, of these indispensable
could change them into two separate factories,
other premises.

The court also reasoned that the calling of the strike by the
International Union, which had authority to do so by a contract
between the Ford Company and the union, was an act by an
agent selected by all the Ford employees and that the latter,
as principals, were liable for such agent's acts.
The result of Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., supra, was followed
in Ford Motor Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Compensation
Comm'n, 243 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1951); Ford Motor Co. v. New
Jersey Dep't of Labor, 5 N.J. 494, 76 A.2d 256 (1950); and in
Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 191
Va. 812, 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951). In the latter case, the court said,
63 S.E.2d at page 34:
The dependence of one or more plants in this great industry upon
the home office and principal manufacturing establishment does
not, however, necessarily make of the entire industry one plant
or one establishment.
In Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Martin, 251 Ala. 153, 36
So.2d 547 (1948), the "geographical" test was also adopted. The
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. transported its own ore, coal, and
limestone from various places. The coal miners were idled by a
strike of the steel workers and ore miners. A recovery of benefits was allowed the coal miners, the court holding the coal mine
to be a separate establishment. In Tucker v. American Smelting
& Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692 (1947) (alternative
holding), an employer who smelted and refined copper also
owned a smelter in Utah and a refinery in Baltimore. A strike in
Utah idled workers in Baltimore and the court held the workers
in Baltimore to be employed in a separate establishment.
In the instant case, the foundry employees were denied compensation benefits because they were unemployed by reason of
a strike involving other workers at the establishment in which
they were employed. Yet it appears that to fulfill the purpose
of unemployment insurance, which is to compensate those involuntarily unemployed, an employee who is not participating in a
labor dispute, nor aiding it financially, should not be subject to
disqualification from benefits merely because he is then employed at the establishment where the labor dispute exists.
Nevertheless, the Kentucky court followed the general trend
of other courts in arriving at its decision herein, justifying its holding by the sweeping disqualification provision in the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Act.
John F. Chmiel
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ZoNNTG-CoNsTIruTIONAL LAw-DscRIINATION BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS.-Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v.
Piedmont,... Cal. App. 2d..., 278 P.2d 943 (1955). Petitioner
owned a tract of land in the city of Piedmont, California, upon

which it wished to construct a school. A building permit was
denied petitioner on the sole ground that the city zoning ordinance prohibited the construction of any school in zone A, where
petitioner's parcel was located, except public schools under the
jurisdiction of the Board of Education of Piedmont. Petitioner
brought mandamus proceedings to compel respondent city to issue the building permit. The court was thus presented with the
question of whether a municipality in the exercise of its police
power may exclude a private school from a zone in which public
schools are permitted.
A peremptory writ of mandate was issued as prayed, the court
following the decisions of other jurisdictions to the effect that no
reasonable basis of classification or distinction exists, in these
cases, between or among schools furnishing the same type of education to a similar group of students. The court chose not to consider the collateral issues of whether a municipality may exclude
all schools from a certain area; whether it could constitutionally
prohibit private schools not engaged in the same type of teaching,
e.g., dancing schools, barber colleges, etc.; whether it could prohibit schools engaged in giving instruction to a dissimilar age
group, e.g., colleges and universities in areas where public elementary and secondary schools are permitted to exist; or whether
an issue of religious discrimination was involved.
Zoning ordinances find their justification in the police power of
the state. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926). Under this power cities, villages and other municipalities
may constitutionally impose reasonable restraints upon the use
of private property. This power to interfere with the general
rights of the landowner by restricting the character of his use is
not unlimited however, and it can only be imposed where the restraints bear a substantial relation to the protection of public
health, safety, welfare, or morals. Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., supra. An ordinance which in its application restricts
the use of private property with no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, welfare, or morals, does so in contravention
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process and equal
protection of the laws as separate rights. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The guarantee of equal protection requires equality of
application of the laws-that all persons similarly situated shall
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be treated alike. State v. Northwestern PreparatorySchool Inc.,
228 Minn. 363, 37 N.W.2d 370 (1949). Thus, a zoning ordinance
must:
...provide those in similar circumstances, among whom no reasonable basis for distinction exists, with equal protection of the law,
as is constitutionally required of all ordinances as well as statutes.
8 McQunImN, Muiqicn A CORPORATIONs § 25.61 (3d ed. 1950).

The vital question in relation to schools under zoning laws,
therefore, is whether there is a dissimilarity between public and
private schools so that a distinction may be drawn between them
regarding their admittance to a particular zoning area without
violating the constitutional guarantee of "equal protection of the
laws."
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that no dissimilarity
exists between private and public schools, and that an ordinance barring private schools from areas where public schools
were permitted ". .. bears no substantial relationship to the promo-

tion of public health, safety, morals, or welfare." CatholicBishop v.
Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583, 585 (1939). Although no
efforts were made to point out what differences, if any, do exist
between a public and private school, the court in that case indicated that none actually did exist. The Supreme Court of Florida,
in looking to the objectionable characteristics of private schools
to the comfort or general welfare of the surrounding community,
concluded that the same objectionable characteristics would probably obtain to the same degree in a public school. Miami Beach
v. State ex rel. Lear, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So. 537 (1937). These two
cases dealt specifically with private schools offering the same instruction to a similar group of students as did the public schools.
A military school offering courses to prepare young men for
admission to Annapolis and West Point was involved in State v.
Northwestern PreparatorySchool Inc., supra. The court was confronted with the argument that if the school were permitted to
exist in a residential district where only public schools and
"churches and schools accessory thereto" were provided for by
the zoning ordinance, other private schools with dissimilar curricula, such as barber colleges, dancing academies and riding
schools, would also have to be admitted to this area. And, if this
last category of schools was to be admitted, a further dissimilarity
-the age of students in attendance-would result. This argument
was rejected on the grounds that barber colleges, etc., do not
constitute institutions of learning. The court also held that a pri-

vate school has no different effect upon a residential district than
does a public or parochial school, and that an ordinance which
discriminates between schools on the basis of ownership is arbi-
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trary and unlawful.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 15 P.2d
391 (1932), the validity of an ordinance providing for an inspection of the premises upon which a proposed school was to be
built was in dispute. If the inspection revealed that a school
building would not be detrimental to public health, welfare, safety, or morals, the common council could, within its discretion,
approve or disapprove the proposed location. Although affirming
the principle that such statutes are constitutionally permissible,
the court held that the unrestricted discretionary power of the
common council to decide whether to grant or deny the building
permit constituted a "....

naked and arbitrary power to give or

withhold consent, not only as to places, but as to persons." 15 P.2d
at 394. The court cited at length the leading case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, as its authority for upholding
the legality of this type of ordinance generally and yet to pronounce it arbitrary and therefore untenable in this particular
instance.
The dominant note in the cases discussed above has been an
insistence by the courts that no ordinance which seeks to arbitrarily restrict the use of private property shall be sanctioned.
In particular cases courts have upheld ordinances which permit
the exclusion of all churches from a restricted area, Church of
Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville,90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203
P.2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949), or which
permit the exclusion of none, State ex rel. United Lutheran
Church v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942). The
primary concern of the courts in the school, church, and philanthropic building cases has been, therefore, not whether zoning
ordinances may exclude them from restricted areas as a group,
but whether one such building can be excluded where others
are not. Until the decision in State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran
High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43
(1954), appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 913 (1955), the states had
been unanimous in holding that it cannot. This case arose on a
mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance of a building permit for the construction of a private high school within a restricted zone. Public high schools were permitted within that
zone. Although stating that the Kingery and Lear cases, supra,
were identical with the present situation, the court ordered the
writ quashed and the permit withheld. The basis for the court's
decision was that a substantial difference did exist between the
two types of schools, in that one was private whereas the other
was public. The court stated, 65 N.W.2d at 47:
To begin with, the term "public" is the antithesis of "private." The
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public school is not a private one. They serve different interests and
are designed to do so. The private school is founded and maintained
because it is different ....
The public school has the same features
objectionable to the surrounding area as a private one, but it has,
also, a virtue which the other lacks, namely, that it is located to
serve and does serve the area without discrimination ....
The private school imposes on the community all the disadvantages of the
public school but does not compensate the community in the same
manner or to the same extent.

The refusal of the Supreme Court of the United States to hear
the appeal in the Sinar case for lack of a substantial federal question seems to indicate that the exclusion of the private school
from an area where public schools were allowed was not arbitrary or otherwise violative of federal constitutional provisions.
The majority of the states, however, in considering the effect
of exclusionary zoning provisions upon individual property and
constitutional rights, regard these provisions as bearing directly
upon state guarantees of "due process" and "equal protection."
The court in the instant case chose to strike down the zoning ordinance on the ground that it denied petitioner equal protection of
the laws, in that there existed no reasonable distinction as regards the application of a zoning ordinance between public and
private schools which would warrant different treatment of one
from the other.
It is submitted that the position of the court in the instant case
is the sounder of the two prevailing theories. Conceding that a
per se difference does exist between public schools and private
schools, the writer nevertheless fails to detect in this distinction
a reasonable relation to the object sought by zoning ordinances.
The effect of discriminating between two groups which are different merely in themselves, but who are similar in their status
to given legislation, is to deny them the equal protection of the
laws. The better constitutional reasoning clearly indicates that
this type of zoning ordinance is properly declared invalid.
Jack Economou

